Napoleon's View of Russia and Intentions for Conquest
Contrary to popular belief, Napoleon never sought to conquer Russia. Factually, it stands as one of his most well-known motivations. However, the history surrounding the Napoleonic War and its conflict with Russia reveals a more nuanced and complex relationship than often portrayed.
Historical Context and the Russian Narrative
When discussing the historical context, especially in Russia, it is crucial to understand how the narrative around Napoleon and his wars shapes the national consciousness. The histories of the wars against Napoleon and Hitler are the most significant chapters in Russian history. Both wars emphasize Russia's role as a victim of unfair aggression, presenting it as a defender and the ultimate victor. However, Russia often oversimplifies or omits significant details to suit their narrative, leading to misconceptions about their involvement and motives.
Napoleon's Intentions and Actions
Napoleon did not initiate war against Russia; rather, he viewed the conflict as a strategic necessity to deal with Britain, not Russia. He understood the vital role that Russia could play in his grand European strategy. The two main European coalitions against Napoleon in the early 19th century both included Russia, but their motivation and actions differed significantly from each other.
European Coalitions and Their Motives
From 1798 to 1801, Russia was part of the Second Anti-French Coalition, which ended with a peace treaty signed in Paris. Napoleon sought to include Russia as an ally, offering Paul I an alliance and returning Russian prisoners. However, diplomatic intrigue led to the death of Paul I, and Alexander I's rise to power led to Russia rejoining the anti-Napoleonic coalition in 1805. Despite Napoleon's tactical victories, he continued to want Russia as an ally, calling Alexander a 'brother' and demanding that he join the blockade of Britain. This desire also saw Napoleon offer favorable peace terms in 1807 during the Tilsit Treaty.
Russia's Preemptive Strike of 1812
However, by 1811, Alexander I decided to forcibly end the threat of 'the monster' (Napoleon) with a preemptive strike. This was partly influenced by fears that Napoleon might be planning larger campaigns against Russia, possibly even an Indian campaign which was discussed in correspondence with the Russian leadership. The plans for such an expedition, including the involvement of French and Russian forces, were indeed being considered, albeit on a smaller scale.
The complex nature of these historical events poses questions about Russia's true intentions. The assassination of Paul I by conspirators, including nobles who had interests in continuing to oppose Napoleon, set the stage for Alexander I's ambitions. The onset of the complex political maneuvering, such as the revived anti-Napoleonic coalition in 1812, indicates that Russia's ultimate goal was not solely defensive but strategically offensive.
Consequences and Napoleon's Failures
When Napoleon's patience ran out in 1812, he attempted to compel Alexander I into peace talks, but Napoleon's plans ultimately failed. This failure was due to a combination of the strength of the combined European forces, including Russia, against him and Napoleon's miscalculations regarding the capability and will of the Russian people to resist the invasion.
The narrative that Russia was purely a victim of Napoleon's aggression is incomplete. By examining the historical records, it becomes evident that Russia was not an innocent bystander in these conflicts but rather a party deeply involved in the geopolitical games of Europe. Understanding the full context of the Napoleonic Wars involves recognizing the complex interplay of motivations and actions on all sides.