Why Japan Excluded IJN Nagato from Operation Ten-Go

During the final days of World War II, Japan executed a last-ditch effort known as Operation Ten-Go, a deadly move to launch the Imperial Japanese Navy battleship IJN Yamato on a suicide mission against Allied forces in Okinawa. However, the Japanese decision to exclude the IJN Nagato, Japan's first modern battleship, from this operation was not random. It was the result of a complex interplay of strategic assessments, operational readiness, resource allocation, and command decisions.

Strategic Assessment

Strategic Assessment played a critical role in the decision-making process. By 1945, Japan's naval strategy had undergone significant changes due to the heavy losses sustained during the early years of World War II. The focus had shifted from maintaining a broad naval presence to executing desperate measures to inflict damage on the Allies. In this context, the IJN Yamato stood out as a formidable weapon, capable of carrying out a suicidal mission with the potential to cause significant harm to Allied forces. Thus, it was deemed more suitable for this one-off mission compared to the IJN Nagato.

Operational Readiness

The condition of the ships was another critical factor. At the time, the IJN Nagato was not in its best operational state. Following earlier engagements, the battleship had suffered significant damage and was far from being battle-ready. The IJN Yamato, on the other hand, was in much better condition and well-equipped for high-risk missions.

Resource Allocation

Resource shortages and a declining fleet further influenced this decision. Japan faced severe resource constraints, and the optimisation of available assets was imperative. Deploying the IJN Yamato alone was seen as a calculated risk to maximize the impact of a single, powerful battleship rather than risking numerous vessels that could be easily overwhelmed. This decision reflected the dire circumstances and the focus on making the most of available resources.

Command Decisions

Command decisions also played a significant role. By 1945, the Japanese naval command was in disarray. Decisions were often made hastily or based on outdated strategic thinking, leading to the exclusion of other capable ships like the IJN Nagato. The lack of coherent strategy and the rush to execute a last-ditch plan may have contributed to this decision.

Post-Operation Ten-Go

After the failed Operation Ten-Go, the IJN Nagato faced a series of challenges. During the escape from the Battle Off Samar, the ship sustained additional damage. It was subsequently hit in several air attacks, leading to extensive repairs. Due to the extent of the damage and the shortage of fuel, she was only able to operate with the aid of an external coal-fired boiler. Most of her anti-aircraft (aa) guns were later removed to help protect the Yokosuka Navy Base. The IJN Nagato would not move under her own power again until she was designated for the Bikini Atoll atomic bomb tests.