Why Did the SAS Avoid Using Reflex Sights on Their MP5s During the Iranian Embassy Siege?

The Iranian Embassy siege of 1980 saw the SAS (Special Air Service) utilize a variety of tactics and equipment, yet some have wondered why they did not employ reflex sights on their MP5 submachine guns. This article explores the reasons behind this decision and discusses the effectiveness of other options available during that time.

The Absence of Reflex Sights in 1980

During the time of the Iranian Embassy siege, reflex sights did not exist in significant numbers or reliability within the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. The most commonly available alternative was the use of Red Dot sights, which were not as prevalent or refined as they are today.

Why Reflect Sights Were Unavailable

Although reflex sights had been used in aircraft gun sights since World War II, the first reliable and useful red dot sight for weapons was not until 1975 by Aimpoint. However, the first viable models were not rugged enough for military use until around 1980. Unfortunately, the Iranian Embassy siege took place in 1980, making reflex sights an unavailable option for the SAS.

Effective Alternatives: The Front Sight Ring and Maglites

Military units like the SAS often rely on other effective options for low-light conditions, such as using the front sight ring of a weapon. The front sight ring, particularly when positioned on the front of an MP5, can act as a clear and visible dot at close range.

The front sight ring alone can be a significant advantage for a tactical shooter, especially in low-light situations. This is because it can be easily brought to the eye and held in the shoulder, making it an effective aiming point. Additionally, a top-mounted Maglite can be used like a laser pointer, allowing for accurate and consistent shots from the hip. These alternatives were widely known and utilized by the SAS during the siege.

Historical Context and Training of the SAS

The SAS was trained to rely on their skills and the equipment they had on hand, even in low-light and close-quarters combat situations. The majority of the shooting during the Iranian Embassy siege would have been at very short ranges, likely between three and ten meters. Given this, the SAS could effectively achieve headshot precision at 10 meters without the need for any sights.

The SAS are renowned for their ability to train extensively in low-light and close-quarters scenarios. Their training and experience enable them to adapt to various conditions, including using the front sight ring effectively. The front sight ring, when combined with a flashlight like a Maglite, can provide a clear and effective aiming point even in darkness.

Conclusion

In summary, the SAS chose to rely on their field-tested equipment and training rather than reflex sights during the Iranian Embassy siege. The front sight ring and Maglite were found to be more effective and reliable options for their specific needs. The availability of these alternatives, combined with the SAS's proven capabilities, made the choice of using reflex sights unnecessary.