The Confederacy's Military Strategy: A Path Not Taken
No professional European military expert in 1861 thought the US had a chance of recovering its rebellious states. The 'Confederacy,' encompassing a territory between Lisbon and Warsaw, faced overwhelming disadvantages at the onset of the conflict. The US had an army of 16,000 men, a tiny fleet mostly for show, and no significant military industries. In contrast, the rebels had called up 100,000 volunteers and began mobilizing their militias even before their attack on Fort Sumter. If the rebels had possessed effective and intelligent national-level military and strategic leadership, they could have struck quickly to secure key strategic points and waterways, making a US counterattack extremely difficult. However, their failure to do so ensured the Union's eventual victory.
After 1861: A Path to Foreign Intervention and Defense
Even after 1861, if the Confederates had employed more effective diplomacy, they might have secured foreign intervention on their behalf. While this was unlikely to be decisive, their remaining option was to defend effectively and at minimal cost, waiting for US war weariness to rescue them. In the west, they did not defend effectively, losing all strategic points but Vicksburg by the middle of 1862, which effectively ended any hope for a military victory. In Virginia, they put all their chips on a commander who gained personal fame through excessive sacrifice of his men's lives, achieving little in terms of strategic objectives.
The Myth of Better Commanders and Material Shortcomings
It is often argued by the Loser Cause advocates that the Confederacy had the best leaders, but they were handicapped by their material shortcomings. While it is true that rebel logistics were poorly managed, and about 27 West Point graduates who made up almost the entirety of active and former US Army officers turned their coats and went south, this does not mean the rebels were better led. The 27 West Point graduates were not necessarily the cream of the crop, as evidenced by the disastrous performance of the rebels outside of Virginia. Even in Virginia, under Robert E. Lee, who had one good year (June 1862 to June 1863), his sloppy tactics made an abattoir of his army.
The Arms Race and Strategic Focus
Military equipment exhibited little differentiation, with most soldiers on both sides using virtually identical weapons, often from the same Springfield and Enfield factories. Few units used breechloading or repeating weapons. There is no evidence that the rebels lost a single battle due to a lack of adequate weapons or ammunition. The Confederates' failure to focus on running out the clock and establish strategic successes suggests a fundamental lack of intelligent and strategic-minded war leadership.
Conclusion: An Analytical Look at Leadership and Strategy
The Confederacy began with more soldiers, at least as well-armed as the Union, which still had an army of fewer than 16,000 men as of the firing on Fort Sumter. It took a couple of years for the Union's industrial and manpower superiority to manifest. If the Confederates had used their resources more intelligently during this period, they could have prevented the conquest of strategically significant points west and south of the Appalachians and could have defended Virginia at a lower cost in casualties. However, the Confederates lacked both good national leadership and good generalship, leading to their ultimate defeat.