German Divisions in Normandy During World War II: Infantry vs Armor
During World War II, the composition of German divisions in Normandy in 1944 was a testament to the strategic differences in planning between infantry and armored units. While the Germans were known for their ability to field a formidable armored force, their divisions in Normandy in 1944 were predominantly made up of infantry.
Predominance of Infantry
The German divisions in Normandy in 1944 were not as well-equipped with armored vehicles as initially thought. While the German defenders in Paris characterized the region, it was actually the German Army in Normandy that was predominantly composed of infantry. On the eve of the Allied invasion, these divisions were heavily reliant on infantry formations.
At the beginning of the battle, the German forces had ten panzer (armored) divisions, but by the month of July, these units were already depleted. This highlights the challenge faced by the German military in maintaining a strong armored presence across the region. The German Army in Normandy was primarily infantry-based, relying on its foot soldiers to hold the line against the advancing Allied forces.
Low Tank Presence
In comparison to the Allies, the Germans did not have many tanks throughout most of the war. The Allies had such a significant number of tanks that, in the fighting in Normandy, it became necessary to assign a support tank to each infantry squad in the difficult Bocage countryside. One notable illustration of this disparity is the story of an Allied anti-tank platoon that did not encounter a single active German tank from the D-Day landings until the Battle of the Bulge.
Strategic Misplacements
The limited presence of German armor in Normandy was further compounded by strategic misplacements. The German forces had a number of infantry formations, which were either static or garrison forces. These units were not equipped to handle the mobile tactics of the Allied forces and were not positioned to provide the immediate counterattack that the Allies expected.
The strategic strength of the German army lay in their ten Panzer divisions, which were meant to confront an anticipated amphibious invasion of France. At the time, there were two competing theories about how these ten divisions should be positioned.
Major General Erwin Rommel, who was in charge of the defense of the "Atlantic Wall," advocated for the positioning of these divisions close to the coast to engage the landings immediately and push the Allies back into the sea. This strategy was, in part, based on his experiences in the deserts of North Africa, where his forces found their ability to maneuver severely hampered by Allied air power. However, his superiors preferred to place the tanks in a more traditional reserve position to ensure they could move en masse to the correct landing site when the invasion occurred.
The final decision was a compromise, with Rommel getting three armored divisions and his counterparts receiving three as well, with four more in reserve, not to be moved without his express authorization. This structure led to delays in responding to the invasion at Normandy, partly due to Allied propaganda efforts to misdirect the Germans and partly due to Hitler's absence from the decision-making process, as he was taking a sleeping pill the night before D-Day and the military leaders were hesitant to disturb him.
Conclusion
The Battle of Normandy in 1944 was a critical turning point in World War II, and the German divisions in the region were primarily composed of infantry. Despite having ten panzer divisions at the start of the battle, these units were not enough to counter the overwhelming Allied presence. The strategic misplacements and lack of coordination between different branches of the German military ultimately contributed to their defeat in Normandy.